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Abstract—In wireless OFDM communications systems, pilot
tones, due to their publicly-known and deterministic characteristic,
suffer significant jamming/nulling/spoofing risks. Thus, the con-
vectional channel training protocol using pilot tones could be at-
tacked and paralysed, which raises the issue of anti-attack chan-
nel training authentication (CTA), that is, verifying the claims
of identities of pilot tones and channel estimation samples. In
this paper, we consider one-ring scattering scenarios with large-
scale uniform linear arrays (ULA) and develop an independence-
checking coding (ICC) theory to build a secure and stable CTA
protocol, namely ICC based CTA (ICC-CTA) protocol. In this
protocol, pilot tones are not merely randomized and inserted into
subcarriers, but also encoded as diversified subcarrier activation
patterns (SAPs) simultaneously. Those encoded SAPs, though
camouflaged by malicious signals, can be identified and decoded
into original pilots, and hence for high-accuracy channel impulse
response (CIR) estimation. The CTA security is first characterised
by the error probability of identifying legitimate CIR estimation
samples. We prove that the identification error probability (IEP)
is equal to zero under the continuously-distributed mean angle
of arrival (AoA) and also derive a closed-form expression of
IEP under the discretely-distributed case. The CTA instability
is formulated as the function of probability of stably estimating
CIR against all available diversified SAPs. A realistic tradeoff
between the CTA security and instability under the discretely-
distributed AoA is identified and an optimally-stable tradeoff
problem is formulated, with the objective of optimizing the code
rate to maximize security while maintaining maximum stability
for ever. Solving this, we derive the closed-form expression of
optimal code rate. Numerical results finally validate the resilience
of proposed ICC-CTA protocol.
Index Terms—Physical-layer authentication, anti-attack,
OFDM, channel training, independence-checking coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
W
ITH the evolution of air interface towards 5G, security
paradigms for the protection of air interface technolo-
gies have attracted increasing attentions in wireless com-
munications systems. Safeguarding the current standard, for
instance, orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM)
or securely implementing the initiation, such as massive
antenna technique, gradually come up on the agenda [1].
The common problem encountered is that the imperishable
characteristic of wireless channels, such as the open and
shared nature, has always been rendering those technologies
vulnerable to the growing denial of service (DoS) attacks [2].
A phenomenon, if we notice, has emerged in the physical
(PHY) layer that DoS attacks, with moderate size of the
involved network segment and modest implementation com-
plexity, have become increasingly common and potent [3].
As their major hacking behaviors, radio jamming (RJ) attacks
have been exhibiting its astonishing destructive power on those
existing [4] and emerging air interface techniques [5].
Among these RJ attacks, protocol-aware attack serves as
the most effective one as the attacker could sense the spe-
cific protocols and intensify its effectiveness significantly by
jamming a physical layer mechanism instead of data pay-
load directly [6]. The typical case which frequently occurs
in massive-antenna OFDM systems is that protocol-aware
attackers always show a great appetite for the channel training
protocol. In this protocol, frequency-domain subcarrier (FS)
channels and channel impulse response (CIR) samples, are
estimated to further the high-quality user experience using
those estimations. The motivations for this case are twofold.
On one hand, multi-antenna OFDM technique has been de-
ployed universally in current commercial and military ap-
plications, which incurs huge interests of malicious nodes.
Since the channel training protocol requires that determinis-
tic and publicly-known pilot tones should be shared on the
time-frequency resource grid (TFRG) by all parties [7], a
pilot-aware attacker could sense and acquire the public pilot
information, and practically behave in such a way that the
regular channel training process may not be maintained as
usual [8]–[10]. On the other hand, everyone has witnessed
the introduction of massive antennas into OFDM technique
which has been promoted significantly in the recent practice,
such as in 3GPP new radio (NR) specifications. In this era, the
precise channel training becomes very crucial to maintaining
the significant multiplexing gains of target users. The bad
news is that imprecise estimation samples could not only lower
down those gains but also benefit others, such as the attacker,
due to the high resolution of antenna arrays. What’s more,
when the channel training is misguided in favour of attacker,
actually without too much efforts, massive antenna arrays in
OFDM systems will be well loved by the attacker.
In this context, authenticating channel training becomes
very critical to the massive antenna OFDM systems since
it determines the authenticity of channel estimation results.
Generally, channel training launched by any certain subscriber
is authenticated by default through the designated public
pilot tones allocated to that subscriber [11], [12]. Apply-
ing the same pilot tones as the subscriber at the receiver
to channel estimation means the exact authentication for
channel training. This process is called the channel training
authentication (CTA) which belongs to the field of physical-
layer authentication [13]. Intrinsically, exact CTA mainly
2depends on the authenticity of pilot tones in a sense that
the claims of identities of pilot tones should be verified.
The uniqueness and non-reproducibility of pilot tones are two
foremost requirements which however will no longer hold
true when a pilot-aware attacker jams/nulls/spoofs those pilot
tones. In practice, attacking CTA process in OFDM systems
is a common phenomenon, e.g., in scenarios with tactical
consideration [14] or in Long Term Evolution (LTE)-based
public safety networks [15]. Those attacks, including pilot tone
jamming (PTJ) attack [8], pilot tone nulling (PTN) attack [9]
and pilot tone spoofing (PTS) attack [10], are very hard to
eliminate once they have occurred successfully.
A. Related Works
Much of the work related to securing CTA has been inves-
tigated thus far. How to detect the alteration to authenticity
and how to protect and further maintain the high authenticity
are two major branches in this area.
The first attempt for narrow-band single-carrier systems is
made in [16] in which the pilot contamination (PC) attack,
one type of PTS attack, was introduced and evaluated. Fol-
lowing [16], much of the work was studied, but limited to
the detection of authenticity of pilot signals by exploiting
the physical layer information, such as auxiliary training or
data sequences [17]–[19] and some prior-known channel in-
formation [20], [21]. Different from those, authors in [22] first
studied the advantage of spatial correlation in the maintenance
of authenticity of pilots, and found that the natural spatial
separation of massive antenna arrays can force PC attack to
occur effectively only in a particular angular domain. However,
we should never forget that the attacker is out of control. In
this regard, PC attack actually becomes more well-directed,
rather than less effective.
The first attempt for multi-subcarrier scenarios was pre-
sented by Clancy et al. [23], verifying the possibility and
effectiveness of PTJ attack. Following this, PTJ attack was
then studied for single-input single-output (SISO)-OFDM
communications in [8] which also introduced the PTN attack
and then extended it to the multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO)-OFDM system [9]. The initial attempt to resolve pilot
aware attack for conventional OFDM systems was proposed
in [24], that is, transforming the PTN and PTS attack into
PTJ attack by randomizing the locations and values of regular
pilot tones on time-frequency resource grid (TFRG). It figured
out the importance that pilot tone scheduling, even being
random, would also affect channel acquisition. Hinted by this,
authors in [10] proposed a FS channel estimation framework
under the PTS attack by exploiting pilot randomization and
the independence component analysis (ICA) theory. One key
problem is that the practical subcarriers are not mutually
independent in the scenarios with limited channel taps, and
thus ICA does not apply in this case. Most importantly, the
CIR estimation is impossible. Basically, CIR is very critical to
the CTA in future 5G mobile eco-systems in which measuring
the multipath before designing systems is mandatory since the
channel has to carry the big amount of data for our “everything
wireless” applications. The knowledge of the channel response
3UR
SRV
HG
8S
OLQ
N&
7$
3U
RWR
FRO

6KDUH3LORW
,QIRUPDWLRQWKURXJK
(QFRGHG6$3V
5HXVH6XEFDUULHUVLQ
$FWLYDWLRQWR(VWLPDWH
&KDQQHOV
6$3(QFRGLQJ
3LORW&RQYH\LQJ
3LORW6HSDUDWLRQ
3LORW,GHQWLILFDWLRQ
&,5(VWLPDWLRQ
6HFXULW\
,QVWDELOLW\)6&KDQQHO(VWLPDWLRQ
&RGH'HVLJQ	2SWLPL]DWLRQ
%LQDU\&RGH
*XDUDQWHH
7UDQVPLWWHU
8VHU
5HFHLYHU
%6
(QKDQFH
Fig. 1. Design methodology for CTA protocol in the uplink; Pilot conveying,
separation and identification are achieved in Section III. Channel estimation
and identification enhancement are realized in Section IV. The tradeoff issue
between security and instability is given in Section V.
represents the aggregate values of gross physical multipath
information. CIR is such a wideband channel characterization
and contains all information necessary to simulate or analyze
any type of radio transmission through the channel. For in-
stance, the amplitude of channel taps could reflect the sparsity
of channel in some cases and their variations could tell us the
Doppler spread, coherence bandwidth, and so forth [25].
To solve those issues, our previous work in [26] proposed
an independence-checking coding (ICC) method which pro-
vides high authenticity guarantee on the FS channel and CIR
estimation based on randomized pilot tones. Nevertheless,
the influence of randomization on CIR estimation was not
evaluated and optimized, which incurs the instability of CIR
estimation. In this sense, CTA not only merely requires the
high security against attacks, but also strongly and necessarily
calls for the high stability of CIR estimation accuracy. As far
as we know, there were very few studies jointly considering
the security and instability during the channel training phase.
B. Motivations and Contributions
The hints from the above investigation further motive us to
build up a secure CTA protocol for massive-antenna OFDM
systems with considerations of the heterogeneity of attack
modes and the instability of CIR estimation
Recall that pilot randomization serves as a commonsense
technique for defending against pilot-aware attack. However,
inserting randomized pilot tones on TFRG solely functions
to transform the attack modes such that the attack issue will
not be insolvable, rather than to resolve the issue practically.
To be more specific, this brings two bottlenecks, i.e., 1)
Unpredictable attack modes;
Problem 1 (Attack Model). A pilot-aware attacker chooses
on TFRG a hybrid attack mode including PTJ attack and
silence cheating (SC) mode. In PTJ attack mode, two be-
haviors are available, i. e., wide-band pilot jamming (WB-
PJ) attack [27] and partial-band pilot jamming (PB-PJ)
attack [28]. In SC mode, the attacker keeps silent for cheating
3the legitimate node. The legitimate node can never acquire the
behaviors of the attacker in advance. All of the three modes
can be very effective due to the node transparency (i.e., no
association or independent with each other) and should never
be ignored.
2) Irreversible pilot information. Randomized pilot in-
formation become irreversible in the following sense:
Problem 2. Randomized pilot information are naturally cam-
ouflaged by random channel information. Those information, if
transmitted by pilot tones for uplink channel training through
wireless channels, cannot be separated and identified.
This problem inspires us to perform the protocol design for
the overall channel training process. The guideline for this is
presented in Fig. 1 where two key requirements are detailed
as follows:
1) Share pilot information through encoded subcarrier
activation patterns (SAPs): Selectively activate and
deactivate OFDM subcarriers by transmitting pilots on
subcarriers or not, and create various SAP candidates.
Encode all SAPs as a binary code. Optimize the code set
in such a way that arbitrary one SAP, namely, codeword,
if suffering a hybrid attack in the wireless environment,
are enabled to be separated and identified securely.
With this preparation, pilot information is conveyed and
encoded as one codeword and further expressed as a
SAP. Secure pilot sharing is thus constructed between
transceiver pairs.
2) Reuse subcarriers in activation to estimate channels:
Generate channel estimators according to the identified
pilots and apply them on the activated subcarriers for
FS channel estimation. Enhance the pilot identification
using the estimated FS channels. Derive CIR estimation
samples from the estimated FS channels.
In this methodology, channel estimation coexists with the
information coding and the two techniques influence each
other. In spite of the security guarantee provided by encoded
SAPs, SAP diversification also incurs the uncertainties as to
the amount and distribution of subcarriers in activation, further
instabilizing the CIR estimation extremely. This entanglement
between security and instability motivates us to perform the
protocol optimization. The main contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows:
1) Protocol Design: First, we establish a fundamental
principle for encoding arbitrary SAPs as a binary code
set precisely. Following this, we develop an ICC theory
to further optimize the code such that arbitrary two
codewords in the code, if being superimposed on each
other, can be separated and identified securely. In order
to evaluate the security for this, we formulate two key
performance indicators (KPIs), i.e., the separation error
probability (SEP) and identification error probability
(IEP). We prove that SEP is always guaranteed to be
zero and also derive the analytical expression of IEP.
We build up an uplink ICC based CTA (ICC-CTA)
protocol in which legitimate transceiver pair encodes and
decodes randomized pilot phases securely through the
ICC codebook, and then performs FS channel and CIR
estimation using the identified pilots.
2) Next, we discover a hidden phenomenon that when FS
channel estimation is performed on the basis of this
protocol, the array spatial correlation existing in the
overlapping subcarriers that also carry information from
both the legitimate node and the attacker can further
help reduce IEP in one-ring scattering scenarios. At
this point, the attacker can actually help the legitimate
node to enhance the security. Interestingly, it can be
proved that zero IEP cannot be achieved only when
the attacker is located in the clusters with the same
mean angle of arrival (AoA) as the legitimate node. This
principle, in this sense, could facilitate the acquisition of
the position of attacker. Theoretically when we consider
the mean AoA with continuous probability distribution,
the security, in theory, can be perfectly guaranteed.
Practically in discretely-distributed case, we give an
analytical expression of how much the security could
be further improved.
3) Protocol Optimization: Finally, we identify the phe-
nomenon of instable CIR estimation in this protocol
and define the stability by the function of probability
of stable CIR estimation against diversified SAPs. In
the realistic scenario with discretely-distributed mean
AoAs, we identify and model the tradeoff between the
security and instability. Interestingly, we prove that there
always exists an optimally-stable tradeoff for which the
CIR estimation can always achieve its optimal stabil-
ity without losing estimation precision asymptotically.
Maintaining this stability, we further determine a closed-
form expression of optimal code rate that maximizes
the security. This code rate indicates how to flexibly
configure the number of activated subcarriers under this
hybrid attack such that desirable security and maximum
stability of CIR estimation can be both guaranteed.
Organization: In Section II , we present an overview of
pilot-aware attack on massive-antenna OFDM systems. In
Section III, we introduce an ICC-CTA protocol. FS channel es-
timation and security enhancement are described in Section IV.
Security-instability tradeoff in CIR estimation is provided in
Section V. Numerical results are presented in Section VI and
finally we conclude our work in Section VII.
Notations: We use boldface capital letters A for matrices,
boldface small letters a for vectors , and small letters a for
scalars. A∗, AT, AH and A (:, 1 : L) respectively denotes the
conjugate operation, the transpose, the conjugate transpose and
the first L columns of matrix A. ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean
norm of a vector or a matrix. |·| is the cardinality of a set.
E {·} is the expectation operator. ⊗ denotes the Kronecker
product operator. diag {a} stands for the diagonal matrix with
the elements of column vector a on its diagonal.
II. OVERVIEW OF PILOT-AWARE ATTACK ON
MASSIVE-ANTENNA OFDM SYSTEMS
We in this section outline a fundamental overview of CTA
issue under pilot aware attack, from a mathematical point of
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SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS.
Notations Description
NT ; Dλ (0 ≤ D ≤ 1/2) Number of antennas at BS; Antenna spacing
∆; θi, i = 1, 2 Angle spread at BS; Mean AoA of Bob, i = 1 and Ava, i = 2
N ; N ;
(
N ≥ N) Total available number of subcarriers within each OFDM symbol time; Length of FFT points
NB;NA
(
NB ≤ N,NA ≤ N
)
Number of subcarriers allocated for Bob and Ava
Ψ=
{
0, 1 . . . N−1} Index set of total available subcarriers
ΨB=
{
i0, i1, . . . , iNB−1
}
, ΨA=
{
i0, i1, . . . , iNA−1
}
Index set of subcarriers allocated for Bob and Ava
x
j
B [k], j ∈ ΨB; xjA [k], j ∈ ΨA Pilot tones for Bob and Ava at the j-th subcarrier and k-th symbol time
ρB, ρA; φk , ϕk,i Uplink training power for Bob and Ava; Pilot phases of Bob and Ava
L; σ2 Number of sampled multi-path taps in baseband, Average noise power of BS
hiB ∈ CL×1; hiA ∈ CL×1 CIR vectors, respectively from Bob and Ava to the i-th receive antenna of Alice
F ∈ CN×N ; FL; FL,k; Fj DFT matrix; FL =
√
NF (:, 1 : L); k-row matrix of FL; j-row matrix of F.
vi [k] ∈ CN×1, vi [k] ∼ CN (0, INσ2) AWGN vector at the i-th antenna of BS within the k-th symbol time
wij [k] = Fjv
i [k], 1 ≤ j ≤ N AWGN vector across j subcarriers for i-th antenna of BS within k-th symbol
σ2B,l; σ
2
A,l PDP of the l-th path of Bob and Ava
yi [k] Received signal vector at the i-th subcarrier and k-th OFDM symbol.
A; {φ : φ = 2mpi/C, 0 ≤ m ≤ C − 1}; C denotes the quantization resolution
Pd = {k1, . . . , kd}, Pd ⊆ Ψ Index set of ambiguous subcarriers under hybrid attack
Ps = {j1, . . . , js}, Ps ⊆ Ψ, |Ps| = s Index set of overlapping subcarriers under hybrid attack
Pa = {i1, . . . , ia}, Pa ⊆ {1, . . . NT}, |Pa| = a Index set of the intersection of S1 with S2
Ri ∈ CNT×NT ; RF Channel covariance matrix of Bob (i = 1) and Ava (i = 2); RF=FTL,sF∗L,s
ρi; ρf = min {s, L} Rank of Ri; Rank of RF
Nd1 ; N
d
0 Total number of non-zero digits in S.1 and zero digits in S.2
Ns1,i; N
s
0,i, i = 0, 1 Total number of nonzero digits for Ai; Total number of zero digits for Ai
dir Digit indicated by RS
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Fig. 2. Diagram of large-scale MISO-OFDM system under the wide-band
one-ring scattering model. In this system, AoA ranges of Bob and Ava overlap
with each other, which incurs an effective pilot-aware attack on the uplink
channel estimation.
view. This refers to the basic system model, signal model,
and channel estimation model. Finally, the pilot randomization
technique is described and most importantly, we identify its
potential challenges in resolving the attack.
A. System Description
We consider a synchronous large-scale multiple-input
single-output (MISO)-OFDM system with a NT ≫ 1-antenna
base station (named as Alice) and a single-antenna legitimate
user (named as Bob). As shown in Fig. 2, the based station
(BS) is equipped with a Dλ-spacing directive uniform linear
array (ULA) and placed at the origin along the y-axis to serve
a 120-degree sector that is centered around the x-axis (α = 0).
We assume no energy is received for angles α /∈ [−pi3 , pi3 ]. The
summary of notations is given in Table I.
For a typical cellular configuration, the channel from Bob
to Alice is a correlated random vector with covariance matrix
that depends on the scattering geometry. Assuming a macro-
cellular tower-mounted BS with no significant local scattering,
the propagation between Bob and Alice is characterized by
the local scattering around Bob, resulting in the well-known
one-ring model [22]. For OFDM systems with frequency-
selective channels, the wide-band configuration is more re-
alistic. Here, we consider the wide-band one-ring scattering
model in which Bob is surrounded by local scatterers within
[θ1 −∆, θ1 +∆] [22], [29].This will contribute to the follow-
ing mathematical characterisation of the advantage of spatial
correlation in security provision as an explicit result, rather
than a complex and unintuitive implication.
We consider pilot tone based uplink channel training pro-
cess on time-frequency domain with N available subcarriers
at each OFDM symbol time. In principle, subcarriers in-
dexed by ΨB are employed for pilot tone insertion and the
following channel estimation. Those pilot tones, known as
reference signals in LTE-A and/or beyond, are deterministic
and publicly-known in TFRG. Each transceiver, by sharing
those tones, can deduce the FS channels and further estimate
the CIR samples. Therefore a single-antenna malicious node
(named as Ava) could disturb this training process by jam-
ming/spoofing/nulling those pilot tones. We denote the set of
victim subcarriers by ΨA and make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Ava is surrounded by local scatterers
within [θ2 −∆, θ2 +∆] and always has common or over-
lapping AoA intervals with Bob, this is, [θ2 −∆, θ2 +∆] ∩
[θ1 −∆, θ1 +∆] 6= ∅
This assumption is supported by the scenario where a
common large scattering body (e.g., a large building) could
create a set of angles common to all nodes in the system. In
this case, the angular spread of BS is broad and the overlapping
of AoA intervals is inevitable. The result is that the channel
covariance eigenspaces of Bob and Eva are coupled and the
5attack is hard to eliminate through angular separation [22].
Assumption 2. We consider the multiple-cluster scenario. Two
types of the distribution model of θi, i = 1, 2 are considered,
including the continuous probability distribution (CPD) [22]
and the discrete probability distribution (DPD) [30], for
instance, discrete uniform distribution with the support of
interval length K .
B. Receiving Signal Model
In this subsection, we introduce the receiving signal model
at Alice. To begin with, we will give the concept of pilot
insertion pattern (PIP) which indicates the way of inserting
pilot tones across subcarriers and OFDM symbols.
Assumption 3 (Frequency-domain PIP). We in this paper
assume xiB [k] = xB [k] =
√
ρBe
jφk , i ∈ ΨB for low overhead
consideration and theoretical analysis. Alternatively, we can
superimpose xB [k] onto a dedicated pilot sequence optimized
under a non-security oriented scenario and utilize this new
pilot for training. At this point, φk can be an additional phase
difference for security consideration. We do not impose the
phase constraint on the PIP strategies of Ava, that is, xiA [k] =√
ρAe
jϕk,i , i ∈ ΨA.
Let us proceed to the basic OFDM procedure. First, the
frequency-domain pilot signals of Bob and Ava over N
subcarriers are respectively stacked asN by 1 vectors xB [k] =
[xB,j [k]]
T
j∈Ψ and xA [k] = [xA,j [k]]
T
j∈Ψ. Here there exist:
xB,j [k] =
{
xB [k] j ∈ ΨB
0 j /∈ ΨB , xA,j [k] =
{
xjA [k] j ∈ ΨA
0 j /∈ ΨA
(1)
Assume that the length of cyclic prefix is larger than L.
The parallel streams, i.e., xB [k] and xA [k], are modulated
with inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). After removing
the cyclic prefix at the i-th receive antenna and k-th OFDM
symbol time, Alice derive the time-domain N by 1 vector
yi [k] as:
yi [k] = HiC,BF
HxB [k] +H
i
C,AF
HxA [k] + v
i [k] (2)
whereHiC,B andH
i
C,A are N×N circulant matrices for which
the first column of HiC,B and H
i
C,A are respectively given by[
hi
T
B 01×(N−L)
]T
and
[
hi
T
A 01×(N−L)
]T
. Here, hiA
is assumed to be independent with hiB. Taking fast Fourier
transform (FFT), Alice finally derives the frequency-domain
N by 1 signal vector at the i-th receive antenna and k-th
OFDM symbol time as
y˜i [k] = diag {xB [k]}FLhiB +diag {xA [k]}FLhiA +wiN [k]
(3)
Throughout this paper, we assume that the CIRs belonging to
different paths at each antenna exhibit spatially uncorrelated
Rayleigh fading. Without loss of generality, each path has the
uniform and normalized power delay profile (PDP) satisfying
L∑
l=1
σ2B,l = 1,
L∑
l=1
σ2A,l = 1 [31]. For each path, CIRs of
different antennas are spatially correlated. With the one-ring
scattering model, the correlation between channel coefficients
of antennas 1 ≤ m,n ≤ NT, ∀l is defined by [22], [29]:
[Rk]m,n =
1
2∆L
∫ ∆+θk
−∆+θk
e−j2piD(m−n) sin(θ)dθ, k = 1, 2
(4)
Here, Rk, k = 1, 2 are symmetric positive semi-definite
matrices. Note that R2 is unknown for Alice and Bob while
R1 is known by Alice.
C. Channel Estimation Model
For the PTS attack, Ava could learn the pilot tones employed
by Bob in advance and impersonate Bob by utilizing the same
pilot tone learned. There exists ΨB ∪ΨA = ΨB and xiA [k] =
xB [k] , i ∈ ΨA. Signals in Eq. (3) can be rewritten as:
y˜iPTS [k] = FLh
i
BxB [k] + FLh
i
AxB [k] +w
i
N [k] (5)
Finally, a least square (LS) based channel estimation
is formulated by the equation ĥicon = h
i
B + h
i
A +
(FL)
+ xHB [k]
|xHB[k]|2w
i
N [k] where (FL)
+
is the Moore-Penrose
pseudoinverse of FL. We see that the estimation of h
i
B is
contaminated by hiA with a noise bias when a PTS attack
happens. As to the characterisation of PTN attack and PTJ
attack, we can refer to the mathematical interpretation in [26].
D. Influence of Pilot Randomization on Pilot-Aware Attack
Pilot randomization can avoid the pilot aware attack without
imposing any prior information on the pilot design. The
common method is to randomly select phase candidates.
Each of the phase candidates is mapped by default into a
unique quantized sample, chosen from the set A. Since phase
information only provides the security guarantee as shown in
Assumption 3, thus without the need of huge overheads, we
make the following assumptions:
Assumption 4 (Time-domain PIP). During two adjacent
OFDM symbol time, such as, ki, ki+1, i ≥ 0 two pilot phases
φki and φki+1 are kept with fixed phase difference, that is,
φki+1 − φki = φ, for reducing the authentication overheads.
Here, φki+1 and φki are both random but φ are deterministic
and publicly known.
Institutively, how the value C increases affects the perfor-
mance of anti-attack technique. This technique also brings up
the subject of Problem 2.
III. ICC-CTA PROTOCOL
As shown in the Fig. 1, this section presents the principles
of pilot conveying, separation and identification.
A. Pilot Conveying on Code-Frequency Domain
Basically, the more phases supported inA, the higher coding
diversity is required, and thus the more available SAPs should
be created. Theoretically, this requires a delicately-designed
binary code and practically depends on how to activate and
deactivate subcarriers as the code indicates. This operation will
inevitably induce a concurrence of activated and deactivated
6subcarriers, and therefore detecting the number of signals
coexisting on one subcarrier is a necessary work before coding.
To achieve this goal, we will employ the technique of
eigenvalue ratio based detection (ERD) proposed in [32]. Here
we consider three symbol time and a 3×NT receiving signal
matrix, denoted by YD, is created for detection. Given the
normalized covariance matrix defined by R̂ = 1
σ2
YDYD
H,
we define its ordered eigenvalues by λ1 > λ2 > λ3 > 0 and
construct the test statistics by T = λ1
λ3
H0
≷
H0
γ where γ denotes
the decision threshold. The hypothesis H0 means that there
exist signals and H0 means the opposite.
1) Construction of Code Frequency Domain: Given the
threshold γ, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
T , denoted by F (γ), can be expressed by F (γ) = 1 −
Pf = Φ
{
ζλ3γ−ζλ1
ξλ1ξλ3χ(γ)
}
, χ (γ) =
√
γ2
ξ2
λ1
− 2ργ
ξλ1ξλ3
+ 1
ξ2
λ3
where
ρ = (ζλ1,λ3 − ζλ1ζλ3)/ξλ1ξλ3 [32] . Here Φ {·} denotes
CDF of a standard Gaussian random variable. In order to
measure how many antennas are required on each subcar-
rier to achieve a certain Pf , a decision threshold func-
tion γ
∆
= f (NT, Pf ) is derived, with f (NT, Pf ) =
ζλ1ζλ3−τ2ρξλ1ξλ3+τ
√
δ−2ρξλ1ξλ3ζλ1ζλ3
ζ2
λ3
−τ2ξ2
λ3
where δ = ζ2λ1ξ
2
λ3
+
ζ2λ3ξ
2
λ1
+
(
ρ2 − 1) τ2ξ2λ1ξ2λ3 , τ = Φ−1 {1− Pf}. Here ζλpi =
E (λpi ) , i = 1, 3, p = 1, 2, ζλ1λ3 = E (λ1λ3) and ξ
2
λi
=
E
(
λ2i
) − [E (λi)]2, i = 1, 3. The related parameters can be
shown as follows:
ζλp1=C
−1
NT,3
3∑
i,j=1
(−1)i+j2Γ (Lα1,1) Γ (Lα2,2)Gi,j (6)
where there exists Gi,j =
Lα1,1−1∑
l1=1
Lα2,2−1∑
l2=1
Γ(l1+l2+pi,j−1)
l1!l2!3
l1+l2+pi,j−1
−
Lα1,1−1∑
l1=1
Γ(l1+pi,j−1)
l1!2
l1+pi,j−1
−
Lα2,2−1∑
l2=1
Γ(l2+pi,j−1)
l2!2
l2+pi,j−1
+ Γ (pi,j − 1).
ζλp3=C
−1
NT3
3∑
i,j=1
(−1)i+j2Γ (Lα1,1) Γ (Lα1,2)G1i,j (7)
where G1i,j =
Lα1,1−1∑
l1=1
Lα2,2−1∑
l2=1
Γ(l1+l2+pi,j−1)
l1!l2!3
l1+l2+pi,j−1
.
ζλ1,λ3=C
−1
NT3
∑
i1,i3,j1,j3
χΓ (Lβ1,1)

Lα1,1−1∑
l1=1
G2i,j
l1!
 (8)
where χ = (−1)i1+i3+j1+j3 and we have G2i,j =
Lα1,1−1∑
l1=1
Γ(l1+p3i,j+1)
2
l1+p
3
i,j
+1
{
Γ
(
p1i,j + 1
)− p3i,j+l1∑
t=0
2tΓ(t+p1i,j+1)
t!3
t+p1
i,j
+1
}
+
Lα2,2−1∑
l2=1
Γ
(
p3i,j + 1
){Γ(l1+p1i,j+1)
2
l1+p
1
i,j
+1
−
p3i,j∑
t=0
Γ(l1+t+p1i,j+1)
t!3
l1+t+p
1
i,j
+1
}
.
For the parameters therein, there exist CNT,3 =
2
3∏
i=1
(NT − i)!, pi,j = NT + p + i + j − 3, p1i,j =
NT+p+i1+j1−5, p3i,j = NT+p+i3+j3−5, α1 = 2, α2 = 1,
γ
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Fig. 3. Performance of ERD on single subcarrier.
Lαk,k =

NT − 4 + k + αk αk < i, k < j
NT − 2 + k + αk αk ≥ i, k ≥ j
NT − 3 + k + αk otherwise
and Lβk,k =
NT − 4 + k + βk βk <, k <
NT − 3 + k + βk < βk < i¯, k <, or,< βk < j¯, k <
NT − 1 + k + βk < βk < i¯, k > j¯, or,< βk < j¯, k > i¯
NT + k + βk βk > i¯, k > j¯
NT − 2 + k + βk otherwise
.
sgn(·) is the Signum function and Γ (·) is the upper incomplete
Gamma function.
Using the expression of γ, we establish a single-subcarrier
encoding (SSE) principle to encode the number of detected
signals into binary digits, i.e, 0 or 1.
Definition 1 (SSE Principle). One subcarrier can be precisely
encoded if, for any ε > 0, there exists a positive number γ (ε)
such that, for all γ ≥ γ (ε), Pf is smaller than ε.
Based on the Definition 1, we can encode the m-
th subcarrier as a binary digit sm according to sm ={
1 H0 is true
0 otherwise
. We should note that f (NT, Pf ) is a
monotone decreasing function of two independent variables,
i.e., NT and Pf . For a given probability constraint ε
∗, we
could always expect a lower bound γ (ε∗) such that γ (ε∗) =
f (NT, ε
∗) is satisfied. Under this equation, we could flexibly
configure NT and γ (ε
∗) to make ε∗ approach zero [32]. We
also find that the value of γ achieving zero-Pf is decreased
with the increase of NT.
To verify this, we consider three OFDM symbols and
flexible configuration of NT, such as, from 32 to 256. We
simulate Pf against various γ in Fig. 3. As we can see, the
required decision threshold γ is decreased with the increase
of the number of antennas. This fact also further verifies the
feasibility of Definition 1. For example, we can find a desirable
point at γ = 1.5, NT = 256 where Pf is equal to zero, thus
facilitating perfect binary coding for each kind of SAPs.
Based on the formulated binary digits for subcarriers in
detection, we denote a set of binary code vectors by S with
S = {s| sm ∈ {0, 1} , 1 ≤ m ≤ Ls} where Ls denotes the
maximum length of the code. Then, a code frequency domain
could be constructed as a set of pairs (s, b) with s ⊂ S and
1 ≤ b ≤ NB where b is an integer representing the subcarrier
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Fig. 4. Pilot conveying on the identified code-frequency domain. Construct an
one-to-one mapping principle under which the phase candidates in set A are
mapped to codewords of binary codebook matrix derived in Section III-A2,
and then further to SAPs. The specific principle is that pilot signals are
transmitted on the j-th subcarrier that occupies three OFDM symbols if the j-
th digit of the codeword is equal to 1, otherwise this subcarrier is deactivated.
index of appearance of the code. This is shown in Fig. 4.
2) Binary Codebook Matrix: On the formulated code-
frequency domain, we group the binary digits and construct
the binary code by presenting a binary codebook as follows:
Definition 2. Given a NB × C binary matrix C with each
element satisfying ci,j ∈ s ⊂ S, we denote the i-th column of
C by ci with ci =
[
c1,i · · · cNB,i
]T
. We call C a binary
codebook matrix and ci a codeword of C of length NB.
The codebook size is equal to the quantization resolution
of phases in the set A. Based on this codebook matrix, a
mapping from pilot phases, to codewords and further to SAPs
is developed in Fig. 4 for pilot conveying.
Pilot conveying provides the basis for pilot separation and
identification which also means the codeword separation and
identification. Therefore, the performance of CTA becomes
totally dependent on the property of binary codebook.
B. Pilot Separation and Identification Via ICC
In this subsection, we present the ICC theory to optimize
the previous binary codebook. Its crucial feature is to create
the “difference” by checking the independence of channels
experienced by different parties. In what follows, we will
introduce the ICC theory by formulating its encoding/decoding
principle.
1) Encoding Principle: Based on the Definition 2, we
further have the following definition:
Definition 3. A NB × C binary matrix C is called a ICC-
(NB, s) code of length NB and order s, if for any column set
Q such that |Q| = 2, there exist at least a set S of s rows
such that ci,j = 1, ∀i, j, i ∈ S, j ∈ Q.
For this principle, any two codewords in C must superim-
pose with each other on at least s non-zero digits.
Remark 1. Basically, s, s ≥ 1 denotes the discriminatory
feature we have created. This feature intrinsically can be seen
as a characteristic that there always exist more nonzero digits
than zero digits. Returning to the subcarriers, s means the
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Fig. 5. An example of decoding strategy using ICC-(7, 1). After observing
the superimposed SAPs from Bob and Ava on TFRG, Alice decodes the
activation patterns of subcarriers in Case 1 as 0 digits and those in Case
2 as 1 digits. The two operations are respectively labeled by S.1 and S.2.
Alice then calculate Nd1 (here N
d
1 = 1); For Case 3, Alice selects an
arbitrary ambiguous subcarrier at position ir, ir ∈ Pd as a reference subcarrier
(RS) (here ir = 4), and further calculates the differential code digits
dir,j with dir,j = fd (Iir,j)
⊕
1 where Iir,j =
〈
yir [k]
‖yir [k]‖ ,
yj [k]
‖yj [k]‖
〉
and
fd (x < r) = 0, fd (x > r) = 1, j ∈ Pd. 〈·〉 denotes the inner product
operation and r is equal to zero. When making decision, Alice makes two
assumptions, i.e., A1 : dir = 1 and A0 : dir = 0. For each assumptionAi, Alice outputs the candidate codeword denoted by ci by performing
⊕
operations between dir,j , j ∈ Pd and dir , ir ∈ Pd. For example, if d4= 0,
and d4,2= 1,d4,3= 1,d4,5= 0,d4,6= 1, we can derive c0= 0110011. The
operations correspond to S.3 and S.4. Alice calculates Ns1,i of ci for i = 0, 1.
(For example, in this figure Ns1,0 = 4 and N
s
1,1 = 3) If N
d
1 +N
s
1,i satisfies
the weight constraint of ICC-(NB, s) code, the hypothesis Ai is correct and
Alice identifies ci as the codeword of Bob, which realizes the codeword
separation and identification.
available number of overlapping subcarriers for channel esti-
mation. The overlapping of subcarriers means the coexistence
of signals from two nodes on the same subcarrier and same
OFDM symbol time.
Theorem 1. The weight of ICC-(NB, s) code of length NB
and order s satisfies w = NB+s2 with NB ≥ s. w is an integer
smaller than NB.
Proof. See proof in Appendix VIII-A
Here and in the following sections, we assume the ratio of
two integer is always kept to be an integer without loss of
generality. Based on the theorem, we can derive the number
of codewords or namely the columns in C, by a binomial
coefficient C =
(
NB
NB+s
2
)
. Then we have the following
proposition about the code rate:
Proposition 1. The code rate of ICC-(NB, s) code, defined
by RICC =
log2(C)
NB
, is calculated as:
RICC (NB, w) = log2
[
NB!(
NB+s
2
)
!
(
NB−s
2
)
!
]1/NB
(9)
2) Decoding Procedure: Despite the fact that the encoding
principle provides the discriminatory feature of ICC, Alice has
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Fig. 6. Diagram of ICC-CTA protocol procedures. Each time the training begins, Bob selects one quantized phase φki from set A, for instance i = 0.
Bob shows the SAPs corresponding to φk0 , as the above mapping principle indicates. Across the frequency domain, the insertion of Bob’s pilots obeys
Assumption 3. This operation applies to all of three OFDM symbols. For the time domain, at the initial symbol k0, Bob inserts onto the pilot subcarriers
in activation the pilot with phase φk0 . The pilots inserted within adjacent OFDM symbols, such as ki, i ≥ 1, obey the Assumption 4. Those SAPs, after
undergoing wireless channels, suffer from the superposition interference from each other, and finally are superimposed and observed at Alice which separates
and identifies those pilots. The technical details could be seen in Fig. 5 and its caption below. Based on the identified pilots, Alice performs channel estimation.
to construct a decoding principle according with this feature
to perform codeword separation and identification
Considering the hybrid attack environment, Alice could rec-
ognize three types of results on the i-th subcarrier i ∈ [1, NB]:
Case 1:None of Bob and Ava transmits signals. Case 2: Bob
and Ava both transmit signals. Case 3: One unknown node
(Bob or Ava) transmits signals. Obviously, Alice can identify
the behaviors in the first two cases but this cannot work well
in Case 3 due to the ambiguity of superposition operation of
signals on subcarriers. For simplicity, we define the subcarriers
in Case 1 and Case 2 as the deterministic subcarriers while
those in Case 3 are defined as the ambiguous subcarriers. The
related decoding principle is depicted in Fig. 5.
Now that we have explored the principle of ICC method in
theory, we ought to look at its performance evaluation.
Proposition 2. SEP, defined by error probability of separating
two right codewords from the observed codeword, is zero.
It is sufficiently feasible that the distance between Bob and
Ava can guarantee that their channels fade independently with
each other. The inner product of high-dimensional receiving
signals on different subcarriers is therefore always precisely
measured under massive antennas, providing the perfect dif-
ferential decoding and thus perfect pilot separation in Fig. 5.
Theorem 2. IEP, defined by the error probability of identifying
Bob’s codeword from the two separated codewords, is given
by
PI =
NB!−
(
NB+s
2
)
!
(
NB−s
2
)
!
2NB+1
(
NB+s
2
)
!
(
NB−s
2
)
!
(10)
Proof. See proof in Appendix VIII-B.
The overall pilot conveying, separation and identification
can be seen in part of Fig. 6.
IV. FS CHANNEL ESTIMATION AND SECURITY
ENHANCEMENT
In this section, we continue our design work for the ICC-
CTA protocol architecture and focus on the FS channel esti-
mation. Two questions will be answered further:
Question 1. How to estimate FS channels based on the
identified pilots?
Question 2. Is it possible to improve the security performance
of ICC theory by further digging the properties of estimated
FS channels ?
A. FS Channel Estimation
It is well-known that LS estimator is a natural choice when
there is no attack. In this subsection, we only consider the
FS channel estimation under PTJ attack shown in the attack
model in Introduction part.
In principle, performing linear channel estimation requires
specifying the receiving signal model and linear decorrelating
estimator (LDE) that weights on the receiving signals for
channel estimation.
Let us consider the construction of LDE. Basically, Alice
examines the decoded pilots which can be, 1) successfully
identified; ( no identification error) or 2) confusing (identi-
fication error happens). We in this section consider the latter
and forget the case without identification error. In this way, the
estimator to be designed naturally apply to the case without
identification error. Within two OFDM symbol time, i.e., k0
and k1, Alice could collect two confusing pilot vectors defined
by xL,1 and xL,2 where xL,1=
[
xB [k0] xB [k1]
]T
and
xL,2=
[
xA [k0] xA [k1]
]T
. The notation of xB [k] can be
found in Assumption 3. Here the confusing case happens when
Ava keeps the same frequency-domain and time-domain PIP as
Bob, which is proved in Remark 2. Then we use the notation
of xA [k] with the only difference, that is, different value with
xB [k].
Then we consider the receiving signal model for which two
facts involved should be clarified:
Fact 1. 1) The phenomenon that arbitrary two codewords
within ICC-(NB, s) must overlap at least on s code digits
does not mean that the total number of overlapping subcar-
riers always keeps stable and constant; 2) The superimposed
signals on those overlapping subcarriers could be employed
for channel estimation and security enhancement whereas the
9subcarrier on which only one signal exists can be utilized for,
but limited to channel estimation.
In order to formulate the receiving signal, we choose two
OFDM symbol time, i.e., k0 and k1, and s, s ≥ 1 randomly-
overlapping subcarriers. The randomness here means the ran-
dom frequency positions of subcarriers. The signals received
are stacked as the 2×NTs matrix YL, equal to
YL = XLHL +NL (11)
where the 2× 2 matrix XL satisfies XL =[
xL,1 xL,2
]
. The integrated 2×NTs channel
matrix HL satisfies HL =
[
hTB,L h
T
A,L
]T
where
hB,L =
[ (
FL,sh
1
B
)T
, . . . ,
(
FL,sh
NT
B
)T ]
and
hA,L =
[ (
FL,sh
1
A
)T
, . . . ,
(
FL,sh
NT
A
)T ]
. FL,s
is the s-row matrix for which each index of s rows
belongs to the set Ps. NL represents the 2×NTs
noise matrix with NL =
[
wTL [k0] w
T
L [k1]
]T
where
wL [k] =
[
w1
T
s [k] , . . . , w
NT
T
s [k]
]
for k = k0, k1.
Remark 2. Since the specific values of elements in Ps are
randomly distributed between 1 and N , the FL,s is no longer
a semi-unitary matrix.
We formulate the sample covariance matrix by CYL =
1
NTs
YLY
H
L and then could derive the asymptotically-optimal
linear minimum mean square error (LMMSE) estimators as
WB,L = TBx
H
L,1C
−1
YL
and WA,L = TAx
H
L,2C
−1
YL
, where
TB
∆
= Tr(R1)Tr(RF)
NTs
and TA
∆
= Tr(R2)Tr(RF)
NTs
. Here, there exists
Tr (R1) = Tr (R2) = NT and therefore we could define
TB = TA = T .
Finally, the estimated versions of FS channels are respec-
tively derived as
ĥB,L=WB,LYL, ĥA,L=WA,LYL (12)
The normalized mean square error (NMSE) for the two estima-
tions are respectively defined by ε2B =
E
{‖ĥB,L−hB,L‖2}
NTs
, ε2A =
E
{‖ĥA,L−hA,L‖2}
NTs
. Furthermore, the relationship between the
ideal channels with estimated versions can be given by
hB,L = ĥB,L + εBh and hA,L = ĥA,L + εAh
′
where εBh is
uncorrelated with hB,L and εAh
′
is uncorrelated with hA,L.
Here, the entries of h and h
′
are i.i.d zero-mean complex
Gaussian vectors with each element having unity variance.
Proposition 3. In the large-scale array regime, there exists
ε2B = ε
2
A at high SNR .
Proof: See proof in Appendix VIII-C
Remark 3. When no identification error happens, Alice only
utilizes the identified pilots of Bob to derive xL,1 and finally
gets ĥB,L.
B. Security Enhancement: Exploiting Spatial Correlation
We are now ready to answer Question 2. Security enhance-
ment in this section means reducing IEP further. To this end,
we should focus on the case where Bob gets two confusing pi-
lots, i.e, xL,1 and xL,2 and two confusing estimated channels,
i.e., ĥB,L and ĥA,L. Even in this case, the identification error
will occur only when Ava keeps the same frequency-domain
and time-domain PIP as Bob, which is proved in Remark 2. In
this section, we will reduce the probability of this happening
in an independent dimension, i.e., the angular domain.
1) Angular Domain Identification: Basically, the process of
identification can be modelled as a decision process between
two hypotheses:
H0 : ĥB,L → Bob, H1 : ĥA,L → Bob (13)
For the sake of simplicity, we define several useful eigenvalue
decompositions, including Ri = UiΛiU
H
i , Ri = UiΛiU
H
i ,
RF = VfΣfV
H
f and RF = VfΣfV
H
f . Here, Ui and Vf
denote the eigenvector matrices and eigenvalue matrices
satisfy Λi = diag
{[
λi,1 · · · λi,ρi 0 · · · 0
]T}
,
Λi = diag
{[
λ−1i,1 · · · λ−1i,ρi 0 · · · 0
]T}
,
Σf = diag
{[
λf,1 · · · λf,ρf 0 · · · 0
]T}
,
Σf = diag
{[
λ−1f,1 · · · λ−1f,ρf 0 · · · 0
]T}
.
We build up an error decision function as
∆f
∆
= f
(
ĥB,L
)
− f
(
ĥA,L
)
(14)
where f (r) = r
(
R1 ⊗RF
)
rH. Then we have the following
theorem to identify two hypotheses.
Theorem 3. When NT →∞, the error decision function can
be simplified as:
∆f = L
{
ρ1 − Tr
(
R2R1
)}
(15)
Proof: See proof in Appendix VIII-D
The further simplification of above equation requires
exploiting the relationship between R1 and R2. Backing
to the Eq. (15), we know that the trace function satisfies
Tr
(
R2R1
) ≤ Tr (Λ2UH2U1Λ1) = Tr(Λ2,pUH2U1Λ1,p)
where Λi,p and Λi,p are respectively defined
by Λi,p = diag
{[
λi,1 · · · λi,ρi
]T}
and
Λi,p = diag
{[
λ−1i,1 · · · λ−1i,ρi
]T}
. The NT × ρi
matrix Ui denotes the tall unitary matrix of channel
covariance eigenvectors Ui. As discussed in [22],
U
H
2U1 can be approximated using F
H
S2FS1 . We defineS1 ∩ S2 = S3 where Si denotes the support of Si (x), a
uniformly-bounded absolutely-integrable function satisfying
Si (x) =
1
2∆
∑
0∈[D sin(θi−∆)+x,D sin(θi+∆)+x]
1√
D2−x2 , over
x ∈ [− 12 , 12]. There exists FSi = (fn : n ∈ JSi) whereJSi = {n, [n/NT] ∈ Si, n = 0, . . . , NT − 1}. We then
discuss the influence of S3 on Tr
(
R2R1
)
. When S3 = ∅,
we can have Tr
(
R2R1
)
= 0. When S3 6= ∅, we assume
S3 = Pa and have
Tr
(
Λ2,pU
H
2U1Λ1,p
)
≤
a∑
j=1
λ2,ij
λ1,ij
(16)
This is because the eigenvectors labeled by the indexes out of
the interacted set S3 are mutually orthogonal [22].
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Algorithm 1 :Channel Estimation and Security Enhancement
1: Identify whether or not PTJ attack happens using the
codewords decoded as shown in Fig. 5.
2: if PTJ attack happens then
3: Derive xL,1, xL,2, and ĥB,L, ĥA,L using Eq. (12).
4: else
5: Apply LS estimator to derive ĥB,L.
6: end if
7: if No PTJ attack happens then
8: Directly derive CIR estimation for Bob using ĥB,L.
9: else
10: Detect if the confusing case occurs.
11: if No confusing case happens then
12: Use ĥB,L for CIR estimation.
13: else
14: Calculate ∆f using Eq. (14) and Theorem 4.
15: if ∆f > 0 then
16: ĥB,L is used for Bob’s CIR estimation.
17: else if ∆f < 0 then
18: ĥA,L is used for Bob’s CIR estimation.
19: else if ∆f = 0 then
20: Identification error happens.
21: end if
22: end if
23: end if
Theorem 4. When NT →∞, there always exists
a∑
j=1
λ2,ij
λ1,ij
=
a. If θ1 6= θ2, there must exist a < ρ1 and ∆f > 0. Otherwise
if θ1 = θ2, there must exist a = ρ1 and ∆f = 0.
Proof: See proof in Appendix VIII-E.
Thus far, we can know that Ava is restricted on a line lying
the center of clusters surrounding Bob, otherwise, its attack is
invalidated, which shows another potential of angular domain
identification in countering attack.
2) Combine Angular Domain with Code Domain to En-
hance Security : Since the pilot identification breaks down iff
θ1 = θ2, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5. Under the assumption of mean AoA obeying
CPD, the IEP PI is equal to zero. Under the assumption of
mean AoA obeying DPD, for instance, uniform distribution
with interval length K , the IEP PI is updated to be
PI
K
.
The proof is institutive since we consider two independent
dimensions, that is, angular domain and code domain, to
reduce IEP. The IEP is lowered to PI by using coding
approach and further reduced to PI
K
by exploiting angular
domain identification. In this sense, the security provided on
the code domain by the ICC-CTA protocol is enhanced at the
same time by fully exploiting the angular domain. Finally, we
give the overall process of channel estimation and security
enhancement in Algorithm 4.
Remark 4. We aim to evaluate the influence of different PIP
principles of Ava on Theorem 4. We need to stress that the key
lies in the following two aspects. On one hand, Ava selects
different frequency-domain PIP principles with Bob. It adopts
different phases across its own activated subcarriers in order
to protect its own correlation property from being exploited
by Alice. In this case, the original DFT submatrix in HL of
Eq. (11) is now represented by F˜L,s with F˜L,s = ΨFL,s. Here,
Ψ = diag
{[
ejβ1 · · · ejβs ]T} represents the strategies
of Ava across subcarriers on which βi, i = 1, . . . , s are
random. As we can see, there exists R˜F = F˜
T
L,sF˜
∗
L,s = RF.
This does not affect the value of function f and thus not
violate the Theorem 4. On the other hand, we examine the
case where Ava adopts different time-domain PIP principles
with Bob. In this case, LLE vector derived by Bob is not
optimal for Ava’s channel estimation since the final pilot
vectors demapped from Ava’s SAPs are actually wrong for
channel estimation. The elements of ĥA,L in Eq. (12) are
further imposed on significant estimation error. Thus Bob
acquires very large ε2A, compared with ε
2
B derived under
asymptotically-optimal LMMSE estimation. Finally, the value
of ∆f must be much larger than zero, which does not violate
the Theorem 4. Actually, this can guarantee perfect security
even θ1 = θ2.
In summary, those PIP principles different with Bob’s strat-
egy can benefit Alice and are not prudent for Ava.
V. SECURITY-INSTABILITY TRADEOFF IN CIR
ESTIMATION
Security advantages originate from the diversified SAPs
using ICC-(NB, s). However, various superimposed modes
of SAPs (SSAPs) affect the stability of CIR estimation sig-
nificantly as those subcarriers in activation are utilized for
estimating CIR samples from estimated FS channels. To begin
with, we show when and why this instability could occur and
then gradually wean ourselves from the constraint of instability
to find a tradeoff between the security and instability in CIR
estimations. Finally, we present an optimal code rate under
which a sufficiently-stable estimation performance is secured.
A. Essence of Unstable CIR Estimation: Random SSAPs
Recall that each pilot phase in use has been mapped to one
unique SAP and thus randomized pilots mean random SSAPs.
When random SAPs from Bob and Ava are superimposed in
wireless environment, Alice will observe two typical SSAPs
which both incur unstable performance. This can be seen in
Fig. 7. The key question is: How to evaluate and reduce the
influence of the instability resulting from random SSAPs on
CIR estimation ?
To answer this question, let us focus on the mathematical
expression of CIR estimation. The CIR generally satisfies
the equation hB,L
∆
= gB,L
(
R
1/2
1 ⊗ FTL,s
)
where gB,L is the
integrated 1 × NTL CIR vector of i.i.d. CN (0, 1) random
variables. GivenR1 and hB,L, the estimation of gB,L, denoted
by ĝB,L , will fluctuate under various forms of F
T
L,s. Note that
the structure of FTL,s is determined by the number s and the
frequency positions of overlapping subcarriers. Therefore, the
key factor influencing the stability of ĝB,L is Ps.
Specifically, we examine Fig. 8 (a). When s < L, the CIR
estimation from hB,L is under-determined with low estimation
11






)UHTXHQF\'RPDLQ
6$36XSHUSRVLWLRQ
D ≥s L
s s
'HDFWLYDWHG6XEFDUULHURQ7)5*
7LPH'RPDLQ )UHTXHQF\'RPDLQ7LPH'RPDLQ
f %Nfff %Nff
7)5*
1RGH'RPDLQ
%RE
$OLFH
(YD
%RE
$OLFH
(YD
1RGH'RPDLQ
 
F

<s L
$FWLYDWHG6XEFDUULHURQ7)5*
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precision. We turn to consider s ≥ L in Fig. 8 (b) where we
could always find a non-underdetermined recovery model.
Nevertheless, the fluctuation of s will directly influence the
estimation stability. Particularly, the random value of those el-
ements in Ps will cause unequally-spaced overlapping subcar-
riers which continue to cause instability and limited estimation
precision. To show this mathematically, we begin by giving the
CIR estimation ĝB,L as ĝB,L = ĥB,L
{
R
1/2
1 ⊗
(
F∗L,sR
−1
F
)}
.
By using hB,L = ĥB,L+εBh, we then expand the equation into
ĝB,L = LgB,L
{(
R
1/2
1 R
1/2
1
)}
−εBh
{
R
1/2
1 ⊗
(
F∗L,sR
−1
F
)}
.
Given the correlation matrix R1 and εB, the minimization of
ε2B defined by the equation ε
2
B = E
{
‖ĝB,L − gB,L‖2
}/
NTL,
is equivalent to:
min
RF
Tr
(
R−1F
)
, s.t. Tr (RF) = L (17)
For this optimization problem, the minimization is achieved
iff RF has the identical eigenvalues, and thus the overlapping
subcarriers are equally spaced, satisfying
Ps :
{
ik, ik+N
L
. . . , i
k+ (L−1)N
L
, k = 0, 1, . . . ,
N
L
− 1
}
(18)
The total number of subcarriers within the interval that extends
from the first overlapping position to the last one can be
derived as:
s∗ ∆=
L− 1
L
N + 1 (19)
Hinted by this, we know how any mismatch between the
indices of Ps with those of Ps could increase the estimation
error and instability.
Based on above observations, we define the condition of
being stable (CS) for CIR estimation as follows:
Definition 4 (CS). The overlapping subcarriers are equally
spaced and meet the number constraint, that is , s ≥ L and
s ≥ s∗
Returning to examine the previous SSAPs in Fig. 7, we can
know that SAPs are diversified, completely under the direction
of ICC-(NB, s) , s ≥ 1 code. Basically, the instability origi-
nates from the random use of codewords and the constraint
of NB and w in ICC-(NB, s) , s ≥ 1 code. Therefore. any
mechanism for reduction of instability must reconsider the
code design. In this design process, we must deal with the
relationship between security and instability.
B. Security-Instability Tradeoff
To begin with, we identify and define the instability by the
following metirc:
Definition 5. The KPI indicating the instability of CIR estima-
tion using ICC-(NB, s) code is defined by ST (NB, w, s
∗) =
1/Ps (NB, w, s
∗) with
Ps (NB, w, s
∗) =
κ (NB, w, s
∗)
C2 (NB, w, s∗)
, 0 ≤ Ps (NB, w, s∗) ≤ 1
(20)
where C2 (NB, w, s
∗) denotes the total possibilities of code-
word pair for which each codeword represents the one choice
from one node, i.e. Bob or Ava. κ (NB, w, s
∗) denotes the
number of codeword pairs that satisfy CS when they overlap
with each other.
In this definition, we should note that κ (NB, w, s
∗) relies
on a fundamental fact:
Fact 2. 1) The number of zero digits in each codeword deter-
mines how frequency CS can be broken down; 2) Those zero
digits, with uniform spacing, incur the most severe interference
on CIR estimation accuracy.
This fact also determines why the instability of CIR es-
timation could occur. We define the Optimal Stability (OS)
condition by:
Definition 6. There always exists Ps (NB, w, s
∗) = 1 under
arbitrary SSAPs.
1) Low-NB scenario: Without loss of generality, we con-
sider the low-NB scenario whereNB is equal to s
∗. Obviously,
CS is satisfied when Ps is equal to the set Ps. In this case,
we derive the expression of instability, defined by
ST (NB, w, s
∗) =
{(
NB
NB − w
)/(
NB − s∗
NB − w
)}2
(21)
with s∗ ≤ w ≤ NB ≤ N .
Based on this equation, we could characterize the relation-
ship between the security (defined by SE equal to 1/PI) and
instability (i.e., ST ) as a fundamental tradeoff existing in the
whole uplink training process:
Fact 3 (A Realistic Tradeoff). The lower code rate brings
the lower instability (Eq. (21)); However, the lower code rate
causes the higher security (Theorem 2 and Theorem 5).
Remark 5. For a mean AoA model with CPD, the tradeoff
does not exist since PI is always zero and thus independent
with the stability of CIR estimation. However, this is not real-
istic since the mean AoA is discretely distributed in practical
scenarios with limited clusters. In this sense, the security-
stability tradeoff is necessary and inevitable.
The drawback of low-NB configuration is that there is no
security when Alice expects to achieve OS condition and
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Fig. 8. The utilization strategy of subcarriers for CIR estimation and the analysis of estimation accuracy and stability. (a) Influence of the number of
overlapping subcarriers on CIR estimation; (b) Influence of the distribution of overlapping subcarriers on CIR estimation; (c) Example of SSAPs with highest
stability but lowest security under low NB (d) Example of SSAPs under high NB with optimally-stable estimation. This example is a worst case where the
zero digits are equally spaced to destroy available subcarriers for stable CIR estimation. s∗ satisfies the Eq. (19) and s satisfies s =
(s∗−1)NB+2s∗
s∗+1
.
thus w should be equal to NB according to Eq. (21). In
other words, the tradeoff under OS condition cannot provide
desirable security guarantee when NB is low. See the example
in Fig. 8 (c).
We always expect to maximize the lower bound of security
by jointly optimizing NB and w. This object motives us to
turn to large-NB case.
2) High-NB scenario and Optimally-Stable Tradeoff : In
this part, we aim to determine the optimal Rs such that the
security is maximized while the OS condition is satisfied.
Maximizing security means maximizing the code rate since
the security is a monotonic increasing function of code rate
Rs. The optimization problem, also namely Optimally-Stable
Tradeoff problem, can be formulated by:
max
NB,w
RICC (NB, w)
s.t. Ps (NB, w, s
∗) = 1, s∗ =
L− 1
L
N + 1
(22)
Before solving this problem, we need to fully understand
Ps (NB, w, s
∗) = 1 under high-NB. According to Fact 2 and
Fig. 8 (d), we have the following propositon:
Proposition 4. OS condition is satisfied iff the number of
adjacent non-zero digits between any adjacent zero digits is
at least equal to s∗ when zero digits are equally spaced for
each of ICC codeword. We say this is named as the s∗-OS
condition.
Inspired by this, we should optimizeNB and w such that the
non-zero digits are constrained to create the s∗-OS condition.
Under s∗-OS condition, NB should always satisfy
(s∗ + 1) (NB − w) + s∗ ≤ NB ≤ N, s∗ ≤ w ≤ NB ≤ N
(23)
The weight w of ICC-(NB, s) should therefore satisfy
s∗
s∗+1 (NB + 1) ≤ w ≤ NB ≤ N . Especially, when w is equal
to NB, we have s
∗ = w. This corresponds to the low-NB case.
In this way, the s∗-OS condition is represented by the
Eq. (23). And the maximization operation should be con-
strained by this equation.
Theorem 6. The optimal code rate maximizing the security
while maintaining the s∗-OS condition can be calculated by
Rs (NB, w, s
∗) = log2
 NB!(
s∗(NB+1)
s∗+1
)
!
(
NB−s∗
s∗+1
)
!
1/NB (24)
The weight and order of optimally-stable code satisfy w =
s∗
s∗+1 (NB + 1) and s =
(s∗−1)NB+2s∗
s∗+1 .
Proof. See proof in Appendix VIII-F.
By exploiting the property that there exists
(
n
k
)
≥
nk
/
kk for all values of n and k, the lower bound approx-
imation of optimally-stable ICC-(NB, s) code can be given
by:
Rs (NB, w, s
∗) ≥ log2η
η
(25)
with η= (L−1)N+2L(L−1)N+L
NB
NB+1
.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical simulations are presented to
evaluate above-mentioned techniques during the CTA process.
A. Numerical Verification for Theorem 4
We confirm the feasibility of Theorem 4 in Fig. 9 (a) where
the strength of∆f is plotted against θi, i = 1, 2 by configuring
NT = 100 and K = 5. To be more specific, the examples
of ∆f are derived from the estimated FS channels and the
correlation model in Eq. (4). θi, i = 1, 2 are assumed to lie
within the set
{−pi4 ,−pi7 , 0,−pi7 ,−pi4}. As we can see, the
identification error happens when ∆f = 0, that is, θ1 = θ2. In
this sense, we verified the feasibility of Theorem 4 and could
envision that the IEP is zero under the assumption of the mean
AoA with CPD.
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B. Security-Instability Tradeoff Curve
In this subsection, we focus on the trade-off related results.
We evaluate in Fig. 9 (b) the fluctuation of NMSE employing
ICC-(NB, s) code under various SSAPs, and then show how
the security-instability tradeoff is developed in Fig. 9 (c).
In Fig. 9 (b), we take the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of NMSE as the evaluation matric. The simulation is
averaged over 100 runs, each of which perform 1000 channel
average. We further consider that NB = 128 are provided and
at most s = L = 6 subcarriers overlap for channel estimation.
As a benchmark for measuring the instability, we simulate
the ideal case where six overlapping subcarriers are always
right selected. As we can see, the CDF of NMSE under this
ideal case is always stable. However, in practice, ICC-(128, 6)
code causes an undesirable status where the phenomenon
of less-overlapping and unequally-spaced subcarriers occurs
inevitably. This induces significant fluctuations of NMSE. As
a consequence, we present in Fig. 9 (c) the possibility of trade-
off between the security and instability by using parameters
PI∗102 and P
1
4
s . We considerNB = s
∗ = L−1
L
N+1 where the
FFT points N is set to be either 16 or 32 while L and K are
respectively fixed to be 4 and 10. As we can see, there exists
a tradeoff curve on which the security has to be sacrificed to
maintain a certain level of stability.
C. Security Under Optimally-Stable Tradeoff
For this part, we should note that the IEP is zero under the
assumption of mean AoA obeying CPD. We consider the DPD
model for the sake of practical analysis, and further simulate
the IEP performance corresponding to the optimally-stable
tradeoff in Fig. 10 (a). In this figure, the 3D plot of IEP is
sketched versus NB and s
∗. We consider s∗ to be from 4 to 12
andK to be 20. k, related toNB, satisfies NB+1 = (s
∗ + 1) k.
As we can see, IEP decreases with the increase of NB and s
∗.
On one hand, the initial value of s∗ determines how fast the
IEP can decrease and what is the minimum value IEP can
achieve. For example, IEP decreases faster with the increase
of s∗, and PI achieves as low as 10−3 at k = 15 when s∗ is
equal to 12. In this case, the number of occupied subcarriers
is required to be NB = 195. On the other hand, the initial
value of NB also determines the tendency for the variable s
∗
to be reduced. Specially, at a large NB, a decreasing function
PI of s
∗, at least within the interval [4, 12], can be created.
D. Code Rate Under Optimally-Stable Tradeoff
In Fig. 10 (b), we evaluate the code rate under the optimally-
stable tradeoff. Before that, we consider the Eq. (9) for
comparison and sketch the curve of maximum code rate under
s = 1 over k. On this reference curve, the code rate increases
and gradually approach 1 with the increase of k. As to the
optimally-stable tradeoff, we simulate the curves of code rate
shown in Eq. (24) over s∗ from 4 to 7. As we can see, the
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code rate in this case is reduced compared with that without
tradeoff consideration. With the increase of s∗, we have to get
less code rate. For example, the code rate under s∗ = 7, k = 21
and thus NB = 167 is equal to 0.5083, which means the rate
loss of 0.4205 (almost 45 percent) is caused by the tradeoff
at this point.
E. CIR Estimation Under Optimally-Stable Tradeoff
Finally, we stimulate the performance of stable CIR esti-
mation in Fig. 10 (c) where the NMSE is presented versus
SNR of Bob under different number of antennas. L and NB
are respectively configured to be 6 and 256. Here, we consider
the estimation using Eq. (12) and assume perfect identification
for attacks. The performance under this type of estimator
is not influenced by the specific value of ρA due to the
subspace projection property. We configure ρA = ρB and do
not consider the case where there is no attack since in this
case LS estimator is a natural choice. For the simplicity of
comparison, we only present the channel estimation under PTS
attack because the estimation error floor under PTN and PTJ
attack can be easily understood to be very high. The binned
scheme proposed in [24] is simulated as an another comparison
scheme. As we can see, PTS attack causes a high-NMSE floor
on CIR estimation for Bob. This phenomenon can also be
seen in the binned scheme. However, the estimation in our
proposed framework breaks down this floor and its NMSE
gradually decreases with the increase of transmitting anten-
nas. Also, we consider perfect MMSE to be a performance
benchmark for which perfect pilot tones, including Ava’s pilot
tones, are assumed to be known by Alice. We find that the
NMSE brought in our scheme gradually approaches the level
under perfect MMSE with the increase of antennas. That’s
because the asymptotically-optimal estimator highly relies on
the statistical covariance matrix which is determined by the
number of antennas.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the issue of pilot-aware attack on
the uplink CTA in large-scale MISO-OFDM systems. We
proposed a secure ICC-CTA protocol in which pilot tones,
usually exposed in public, are now enabled to be shared
between legitimate transceiver pair, with high security under
hybrid attack environment. Theoretically, we discovered an
critical fact that this architecture could exhibit a perfect
security if the CPD model of mean AoA was considered.
In practical scenarios with the DPD model of mean AoA,
this architecture was required to make tradeoff between the
security and stability of CIR estimation. We showed that given
a suitable code rate, stable CIR estimation could be always
maintained under a high security. We conclude this paper
by pointing out some interesting topics for future work. As
one interesting direction, more delicate optimization on the
tradeoff could be further researched such that the code rate
under optimally-stable tradeoff could be higher. The extension
to solving the issue of pilot contamination in massive MIMO
systems could be another interesting direction since the pilot
phases guaranteed by our scheme can be superimposed onto
the traditional optimized pilots and thus control even avoid
pilot contamination in multi-cell scenarios with only three
OFDM symbol time.
VIII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Since codewords in this constant-weight code are con-
strained to be with same and fixed length, the number of
overlapping digits achieves its minimum only when the zero
digits of each codeword are fully occupied. In this case,
the remanent digits, i.e., the overlapping digits, account for
2w −NB which should be equal to s and less than w.
Therefore, we can prove the theorem.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Considering the hybrid attack, we know that there exists
the possibility of 2NB codewords to appear. Two interpreted
codewords derived under A1 and A0, if satisfying Nd1 +
N s1,1 = N
d
1 + N
s
1,0, will confuse Alice. In this case, each
assumption is decided with the probability of 0.5. The possible
number of codewords that satisfy this condition is equal to
NB!(
NB+s
2
)
!
(
NB−s
2
)
!
. One exception is when the codeword of
Ava is identical to that of Bob. In this case, the codeword
can be uniquely identified. Finally, there exists the possibility
of NB!(
NB+s
2
)
!
(
NB−s
2
)
!
− 1 codewords that could cause identifi-
cation errors. Then the ultimate IEP can be proved.
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Taking Bob for example, we can derive the estimation
error as ε2B = T
(
1− TxHL,1C−1YLxL,1
)
. Now let us focus on
the term CYL . We can express hB,L as gB,L
(
R
1/2
1 ⊗ FTL,s
)
where gB,L is the integrated 1 × NTL CIR vector of
i.i.d. CN (0, 1) random variables. Based on the Lemma
B.26 in [33], CYL is then transformed into CYL
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
1
NTs
XLRCX
H
L + σ
2I2. Here, the 2 × 2 matrix RC satis-
fiesRC = diag
{[
Tr (R1)Tr (RF) Tr (R2)Tr (RF)
]T}
.
Therefore, we can derive ε2B = T
{
1− xHL,1
(
XLX
H
L
)−1
xL,1
}
at high SNR region. In the same way, we can derive ε2A =
T
{
1− xHL,2
(
XLX
H
L
)−1
xL,2
}
. After calculating the matrix
inverse and performing matrix multiplication, we can finally
verify ε2B = ε
2
A. This completes the proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Thanks to ĥB,L = hB,L − εBh, the measure
f
(
ĥB,L
)
can be expressed as the equation satisfying
f
(
ĥB,L
)
= (hB,L − εBh)
(
R1 ⊗RF
)
(hB,L − εBh)H. This
equation can be expanded intof
(
ĥB,L
)
= f1− 2f2+ f3 with
f1 = hB,L
(
R1 ⊗RF
)
hHB,L, f2 = εBhB,L
(
R1 ⊗RF
)
h and
f3 = ε
2
Bh
(
R1 ⊗RF
)
h. By using the Lemma B.26 in [33] for
each term, we can have
f(ĥB,L)
NTs
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
ρ1L+ε
2
BTr(R1⊗RF)
NTs
.
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In the same way, we can obtain the relationship
f(ĥA,L)
NTs
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
LTr(R2R1)+ε2ATr(R1⊗RF)
NTs
. As indicated
in Proposition 3, there exists ε2B = ε
2
A. By comparing the
two simplified results of f
(
ĥB,L
)
and f
(
ĥA,L
)
, we can
complete the proof.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
First, we will prove
a∑
j=1
λ2,ij
λ1,ij
= a. As shown
in [22], the empirical CDF of eigenvalues of Ri can
be asymptotically approximated by the samples from
{Si ([n/NT]) , n = 0, . . . , NT − 1}. Therefore, the eigenval-
ues of different individuals, if overlapping at the same location,
e.g., n, can be approximated with the same eigenvalue. In
this case, the ratio of two eigenvalues at the same location
is one and therefore, we can prove
a∑
j=1
λ2,ij
λ1,ij
= a for a
overlapping positions. Then we prove that there must a < ρ1.
Examining [θ2 −∆, θ2 +∆] and [θ1 −∆, θ1 +∆], we found
that if θ1 6= θ2 is satisfied, there must exist a < ρ1
since [θ2 −∆, θ2 +∆] must have non-empty intersection with
[θ1 −∆, θ1 +∆]. In this case, the number of elements in S3
is reduced to be smaller than that ρ1. Now we turn to the case
θ1 = θ2 in which we easily have R1 = R2 and therefore the
theorem is proved.
F. Proof of Theorem 6
Let us determine the value of minimum of w. From Eq. (23),
we know that there exists w ≥ s∗ and w ≥ s∗
s∗+1 (NB + 1).
Since NB ≥ s∗, we can acquire w = s∗s∗+1 (NB + 1) as the
minimum of w. Note that it satisfies w ≥ NB+12 for s∗ > 1. In
this case, the value of C will decrease with the increase of w.
Thus the maximum code rate, i.e. maximum security, can be
achieved at this weight. Moreover, according to the Theorem
1, we can know there exists w = NB+s2 for an ICC-(NB, s)
code and therefore we can derive the relationship between s
and s∗. The theorem is finally proved.
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